Guyana Journal |

INTRODUCTION
The eradication of poverty, security of humanity and respect for human rights are linked to the radical reform of the United Nations (UN), Governments in the North and the South, Corporations and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Administrative and political reforms at the level of the UN will not be enough to ensure the achievement of the MDGs. It must be accompanied by equally radical reforms among all stakeholders. None has a monopoly on wisdom or is sufficiently equipped to deal effectively with poverty eradication. In a few days, the Heads of States or Governments, representing most of the nation-states on earth will meet to decide on key UN reforms and recommit themselves to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Confederation of Labor (WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) concur with reports from CSOs, Governments and Multilateral Institutions that at the present pace of implementation of commitments made at the 2000 Millennium Summit, we will not achieve the MDGs by 2015.

It is therefore necessary to reexamine comprehensively the strategies, policies, programs and roles of the various stakeholders with a view to ensure that mistakes are not repeated, and that new approaches to poverty eradication and development, reenergize the efforts towards achieving the goals. It is in this context that I wish to reflect on the theme of this Roundtable: “United Nations and Civil Society” and reiterate the positions of the WCL/ICFTU that were expressed at the General Assembly Hearings with CSOs in June 2005.

MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) conceived by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and implemented by governments of developing and transition economy countries were severely criticized and blamed for weakened states, increasing and deepening poverty, low or negative growth rates and escalating debts. In 1996, the IFIs responded to the widespread criticisms and policy failures by launching the HIPC Initiative (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries).

The stated objective was to provide a framework for debt forgiveness and the investment of those resources in the social services with a view to reducing poverty. A major condition to benefit from the initiative was the preparation and implementation of Interim-Poverty Strategy Reduction Papers (PRSPs) and later Full-PRSPs that emphasized growth and poverty reduction. One condition was that governments had to consult civil society. The IFIs emphasized that ownership of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) by the developing countries was crucial.

The initiative did not bear the expected fruits. Low or negative growth rates, escalating debts, slow response of donor countries on debt relief and increased poverty led to a modification of the original HIPC. In 1999, the modified initiative promised deeper, broader and faster relief, and also to establish a stronger link between debt relief and poverty reduction. In the United Nations Millennium Summit Declaration of 2000, governments around the world committed themselves to eight development goals, one of which is the halving of poverty by 2015. The IFIs embraced the MDGs and viewed the PRSPs as frameworks that could make the goals realizable. The UN Financing For Development Conference (FFD) of 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico endorsed closer cooperation between the IFIs, UN and WTO. There is an annual meeting between the IFIs, UN-ECOSOC and WTO. Why then, with the closer relations between the UN and the IFIs, the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals are scoring so poorly? Is there consensus and sufficient coordination on Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies?

PRSPs REVIEWS
In an article published in Development Policy Review (DPR) 2005: “The Macro Content of PRSPs-Assessing the Need for More Flexible Macroeconomic Policy Framework”, 15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were reviewed from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. It concluded that “policy frameworks lack the necessary flexibility to deal with external shocks and address macroeconomics volatility appropriately.” It recommends “a set of policy measures, including avoidance of excessively tight inflation and fiscal targets (with provisions for fluctuations in commodity prices), more room for counter-cyclical policy and adoption of permanent safety nets.”2

Another article in the DPR 2005 entitled “The PRSP approach and the illusion of improved aid effectiveness: Lessons from Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua” adds to emerging policy differences. It states that “donors claim that the PRSP approach will increase aid effectiveness since PRSPs will enhance broad country ownership and lead to better ‘partnership’ with donors, implying more donor coordination under government leadership.” It concludes that by “emphasizing rational planning and ignoring politics, the PRSP approach has unintended and sometimes harmful consequences.”3

THE GUYANA EXPERIENCE
The Guyana experience presents numerous problems that must be overcome for that nation-state to achieve the MDGs. The Government of Guyana (GOG) in 1992 inherited an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) from the previous administration. It was the severest structural adjustment program implemented in the global south.

Unemployment escalated and poverty in the short term deepened. The new government continued the reforms that resulted in an average growth rate of about 7% during 1992-1997. Poverty it is claimed was reduced by 10%. Poverty in the hinterland and rural areas were not reduced and the gap between the rich and the poor widened. This clearly underlined that the impact of growth on poverty is limited and lacks equity. From 1998 to 2005, the growth rate was reduced drastically. The cumulative growth rate is 0.5%. It is calculated that it takes 2% growth rate to reduce poverty by 1%. As such, poverty in Guyana is not reducing, and if one depends on a high growth rate to reduce poverty, then GOG will not achieve the MDGs.

The political party in government has had a consistent record of supporting state intervention in the economy and for investments in the social services. However, it decided to continue with the implementation of the ERP and committed itself to privatization and continuous deregulation of the economy. In 1994, the GOG invited the Carter Center to assist it in designing a National Development Strategy (NDS) with “homegrown policies and programs that would advance economic development and reduce poverty.”4 The NDS did not contain a calculation of the cost and failed to identify sources of finance for implementation. The vision of the plan became a hallucination! Why did the UN and the IFIs not assist the GOG to implement the NDS? Will the reforms of the UN place it in a position to assist countries like Guyana to implement its NDS?

Two years later in 1996, the IFIs launched the HIPC Initiative. The GOG entered the HIPC Program and prepared its I-PRSP in June 2000. A Business Summit was held and a plan was agreed on how to attract private investments. In 2001, the GOG prepared a full PRSP and in the process did extensive consultations with civil society as was requested by the IFIs and donors. The GOG claims that the PRSP incorporated the findings of the NDS, the Business Summit and the I-PRSP. There are differences within Guyana as to the veracity of that claim. The GOG obtained debt relief under the original and enhanced HIPC Initiatives and has reduced its debt by 54%.5 Guyana external debt declined from US$2.1B in 1992 to about US$1.2B in 2004.6

The GOG committed itself to the achievement of the MDGs and the implementation of the PRS. The PRS emphasizes broad based growth, stronger institutions, investment in human and physical capital, improved targeting of poverty measures and environmental protection.7

Guyana has a serious race problem between Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese. The predominantly Afro-Guyanese, Trade Union Congress (TUC) and official opposition Peoples National Congress (PNC) did not participate in the consultations. The Private Sector Commission (PSC) did not participate contending that the consultation was about poverty and not business. The point to be underlined is that the GOG committed itself to a neo-liberal economic strategy that is the basis of the PRS in spite of its fundamental differences with the IFIs. The GOG, IFIs, UN and the Donor Agencies in general are supportive of investments in health, education, and access to safe water supply and social infrastructure development. The IDB consistently provides financial resources in significant quantities to support the implementation of the PRSP. It finances projects of the GOG Social Amelioration Program (SIMAP). The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) made available its Basic Needs Trust Fund (BNTF) to also finance social infrastructure projects. There has been an upsurge in the post-1992 period of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) particularly in the area of HIV/AIDS program. Most of the NGOs are service oriented and were born in response to available funding. There are numerous international and inter-hemispheric institutions with representatives assisting in Guyana: IMF, World Bank, IDB, PAHO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO has an HIV/AIDS Project, CIDA, USAID, DFID and European Union (EU). It is evident that the GOG shares economic governance with the IFIs, IDB and Donor Agencies. Why, in spite of this, the GOG will not achieve the MDGs and poverty reduction?

The GOG issued a “Report On Progress Towards The Achievement Of The Millennium Development Goals” in July 2003. It stated that

Goal 1: reduction of extreme poverty in 2015 is achievable if the growth rate can be restored to 5-6% per annum;
Goal 2: it claimed that 97% of children were enrolled at the basic education level;
Goal 3: it recorded that some progress has been made;
Goal 4: a gradual decline was reported and rates were still high and trends could not be ascertained;
Goal 5: will not be achieved and mention was made of weak data collection capacity;
Goal 7: it reported achievements inconsistent with reversals;
Goal 8: it reported some progress but recent reversals. In the said report the then UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator in his foreword to the report stated: “poor people can hold their politicians accountable for achieving the poverty reduction targets within the specified timetable.”8

The GOG in its evaluation of PRSP consultations with civil society claimed that one negative aspect was that consultations raised high expectations on the part of the poor about deliverables that the government did not have the resources to meet.

Recently, the GOG issued a PRSP 2005 Progress Report. The Report was prepared by a Policy Coordination and Program Management Unit (PCPMU). It was presented formally to the public and since then the draft has been circulated widely among Donors and CSOs. A previous report was made in 2002. The Final Report will be presented to the World Bank in October [2005]. The PCPMU secretariat is financed by UK Department for International Department and the World Bank. The report underlined that Guyana uses the Income Approach, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the Living Conditions Survey (LCS) and the Basic Needs Index to measure poverty. Since the HIES will publish its report in 2006, the PRSP 2005 Progress Report used the last census data. This approach has drawn widespread criticism. The report emphasizes the GOG investments in water, electricity, education, housing and land titles. The report’s employment figures have been questioned. The report highlights that the GOG has advanced in all the sectors. It criticized the donors for lagging behind in their pledges. However, at the public forum where the report was presented, the CIDA representative in Guyana objected and requested that the statement be deleted. There is a view among the CSOs that the government formulated the PRSP in order to obtain debt reduction but is not really committed to the implementation of the strategy.9 The GOG sees the glass as half full while the CSOs sees it as half empty.

Among the comments made by the UNDP in Guyana on the Progress Report were: 1) considering capacity constraints in the public sector the report is an achievement 2) emphasis was placed on what was achieved ignoring what was not done and what problems exist 3) the 2002 Population Census showed good data on several issues but not sufficiently adequate regarding the impact of the implementation of the PRSP 4) the data on the labor force participation rates of men and women was problematic 5) the manner in which HIV/AIDS issue was reported ignored its impact on the economy and need for a comprehensive national strategy 6) “the emphasis that the PRSP places on Economic Growth to achieve poverty reduction might be overstated. Economic Growth is necessary but not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction. Therefore pro-poor policies need to be introduced into the macro-economic framework.” 7) Governance issues were treated superficially 8) “Since the PRSP was prepared within the constraints set by the anticipated funding flows, it was not possible to identify the totality of actions (and consequent resources) needed to achieve the targets set by the MDGs and by the Sector Plans. This leads to the absence of a coherent analysis of what should be the resource mobilization target. That information is critical to the process of negotiations with Development Partners, in the context of MDG 8. Concrete plans need to be made to identify the country specific MDG targets, which can then be costed, thereby opening up another area of analysis and strengthening the country’s negotiating position.”10

Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Officials in a recent statement highlighted that Guyana and Haiti will not achieve the MDGs related to health.

The Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) in a number of briefing papers highlighted that donors emphasize technical solutions rather than good governance; are not accountable to anyone internally; the government is more accountable to donors than taxpayers since they are the increasing source of funding and “that market forces, the engine of the system, allow no space for considerations of equity, justice or other values that imply regulation, moderation or control.”11

The GOG has emphasized in the PRSP the need to create decent jobs. However, employment targets have not been set in the PRSP. The WCL/ICFTU has been lobbying multilateral institutions to recognize the importance of job creation. This is why, in June here at the UN, once more, trade unions called for a resolution to be approved at the upcoming summit to establish decent jobs as GOAL 9. The experience in Guyana strengthens our case. For example, access to safe water is a priority for the GOG and Donors. Recently, the CEO of Guyana Water Incorporated (GWI) on television announced that many households will have their water supply disconnected if they do not pay up their water bills. How do unemployed households pay water bills? Millions of dollars are spent to provide safe access to water and later the access is terminated because the poor are unemployed and cannot pay the water bills. How do we achieve the MDGs with these shortsighted policies?

The GOG and the people of Guyana face a number of other hurdles towards the achievement of the MDGs. Guyana depends on exports in sugar, rice, bauxite and lumber. Its gold industry is in decline. Sugar accounts for over 50% of its agricultural production. At 17%, it is the single highest contributor to GDP and largest foreign export earner (US$133 M per year). The industry facilitates 5,000 private cane farmers and 10,000 persons provide goods and services for the industry. It employs 17,500 permanent and 4,000 temporary workers. It supports 24% of Guyana’s population. The EU intends to cut the price it pays for Guyana sugar by 39% that amounts to US$40M and the Caribbean US$100M annually.12 The G8 has included Guyana in its debt forgiveness declaration at its recent meeting. The other major problem Guyana and all poor countries face today is the exorbitant oil prices. It will not be possible to reduce poverty with the present oil prices. Will the oil corporations declare their exorbitant profits and support a fund for poverty reduction? How will Guyana achieve the MDGs and benefit from debt forgiveness under these circumstances? What is given with one hand is taken away by the other? These policies are evidently contradictory.

The PRSP emphasizes the creation of an enabling national environment for investments. Guyana during the 19th and 20th centuries has only attracted significant investments in the primary sector of the economy. Today, the country faces similar problems in attracting investors. The GOG problems are compounded by major social, security and governance issues. The British and American administrations in pursuit of cold war objectives in the 1960s imposed an electoral system (Proportional Representation) that institutionalized racial voting. The country has two major racial groups: Indo Guyanese (majority) and Afro Guyanese (minority). Since 1992, when the country begun to have free and fair elections, the (PPP) political party of predominantly Indo Guyanese won all the elections. After each election since then, the predominantly Afro Guyanese opposition party (PNC) led protest demonstrations that degenerated into racial violence in which Guyanese women in particular were selectively targeted. Constitutional reforms are yet to address this electoral issue effectively. This political instability is a disincentive to both local and foreign investors. This problem is now compounded with a major security problem.

Guyana has become a major trans-shipment point for narcotics. “Drug lords” have emerged in the society and wield important influence in the country. CSOs fear that the nation-state can become a “narco-state.”13 Additionally, both Canada and the USA have deported many “hardened criminals” of Guyanese origin back to Guyana. It is ironic that Guyanese teachers and nurses emigrate to the USA and Canada while world class criminals are returned to provide leadership and technological know-how to local “gang and drug lords.” The drug problem and the deepening of poverty have contributed to the escalation of crime by “gang lords.” Robberies have escalated and businessmen and women are increasingly targeted. The general climate of insecurity intensifies the emigration of Guyanese to OECD countries. Eighty three (83%) of Guyanese university graduates live in OECD countries.14 There is an urgent need to deepen the professionalism and capacity of the military and police forces to respond to the crime wave and secure the porous borders from narcotics entering the country. Can the UN and other international institutions assist the GOG before the country degenerates to a reality similar to Haiti? Will it not cost less now than intervening later? There is no doubt that the UN is presently implementing social cohesion and development projects within the framework of PRS and the MDGs, but the social, security and governance issues are undermining the international cooperation efforts to bear fruits. Will the reforms proposed by the Secretary General respond to these problems at the national levels? Can the UN, even with reforms, respond alone and be effective, in a case like Guyana?

It is in this background of concrete problems in Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia and Guyana that I wish to make a few brief remarks in answer to the questions posed at this roundtable. How can thousands of NGOs effectively shape a credible, coherent voice at the UN? How can civil society organizations reorganize themselves to be more effective partners of the United Nations?

Labor has been speaking with one voice for sometime now at the UN, IFIs and WTO. Here at the UN, both WCL and ICFTU representatives work within an informal Labor Caucus to mainstream labor’s policy issues. Both the WCL and ICFTU have permanent representatives at the UN and have invested financial and human resources supporting the work of the UN. In Washington DC, both the ICFTU and WCL jointly meet biannually with the Heads, Management and Senior Staff of the IFIs to dialogue on policy issues affecting labor. At the WTO, we also coordinate and have joint policy positions. At the World Social Forum, both the WCL and ICFTU worked with NGOs to form the Global Call To Action Against Poverty (GCAP). At the World Economic Forum and the ILO we also coordinate our policy positions. Last, but not least, the WCL and ICFTU are engaged in intense negotiations to launch, next year, one united international trade union central. All trade unions around the world will be invited to join. It will be democratic and pluralist. Labor therefore is “ahead of the game” in deepening a coherent voice for workers and their organizations in almost every country on earth. NGOs face a very complex challenge in this regard, but both ICFTU and WCL have consistently extended a hand to all civil society organizations, to work together on issues that are of vital interests to workers and humanity as a whole.

Is it enough that the intergovernmental mechanisms of the United Nations be modernized, if member states fail to engage in multilateral efforts to solve shared problems?

The WCL/ICFTU is committed to multilateralism. We believe that unilateralism will destabilize the world and is incapable of effectively dealing with development, peace or human rights. At the beginning of this presentation, I underlined emphatically that not only the UN has to reform and modernize, but also all governments, North and South, IFIs, WTO, private sector and CSOs. The problems of development, poverty eradication and peace are too complex and costly to be dealt with by one nation-state or one global or inter-hemispheric institution. The realities of Guyana, Honduras, Bolivia and Nicaragua, as discussed above, confirm this.

What role can civil society demand in an intergovernmental body such as the United Nations?

The trade union movement accompanied the UN from its inception. Labor has enjoyed consultative status at the UN since the founding of ECOSC. We had hoped to obtain a seat on ECOSOC, and we still believe that labor can make a more important and effective contribution should we obtain that seat. Labor enjoys a unique position at the ILO. The problems that face workers and trade unions are related to the work of all UN Agencies. As such, we would like to enjoy strengthened consultative and advisory roles across the board. Additionally, in key UN decision making organs like the General Assembly and the Security Council labor does not enjoy consultative status. This ought to be corrected. Labor supports the establishment of new Councils as proposed by the Secretary General but we also ask that CSOs be granted consultative status. The UN and all international institutions have to give meaning to the consultative policy making processes by including the inputs of CSOs when they are consulted. This is a major deficiency in the relations between CSOs, the UN and other international institutions.

1 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) & World Confederation of Labor (WCL) represents trade union centrals in over 160 countries.
2 PRS Watch/PRS Watch@host.netalantic.com/August/17th 2005.
3 IBID,PRS WATCH.
4 I-PRSP/June 2000/GOG Document.
5 Guyana: IMF & World Bank Support US$334 Million Additional Debt Relief/News Release No: 2004/195/LACHTTP://website.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/GUYANAEXT/7/20/05).
6 PRSP Progress Report 2005/Chapter2/Georgetown/Guyana.
7 PRSP 2001/GOG Document.
8 Report On Progress Towards The Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals/Guyana July 2003.
9 Interviews conducted in Guyana with several NGO/August 2005.
10 UNDP Comments On The 2005 PRSP Progress Report.
11 Civil Society Forum On Solidarity And Inclusiveness/Background Briefing Papers 1-4 December 2002/GHRA &Others/Georgetown, Guyana).
12 Narine, Seepaul: GAWU General Secretary’s General Council Report/2005.
13 Interviews with several NGOs in Guyana August 2005.
14 Economist, April2, 2005.

Paul N. Tennassee is WCL Representative United Nations/Director WCL Washington Liaison Office.
He is also Producer/Host: CaribNation Television Program.

Editor’s Note: This article was emailed to the Office of the President, Georgetown, Guyana for comments. The Liaison Officer acknowledged receipt and said he forwarded it to the Head of the Secretariat. No response was received at press time.

		This Issue \| Editorial \| Feature \| E-mail
		THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY U.N. 58th Annual DPI/NGO Conference Our Challenge: Voices Of Peace, Partnerships And Renewal September 7-9th, 2005 Presentation On Behalf Of WCL/ICFTU 1 INTRODUCTION The eradication of poverty, security of humanity and respect for human rights are linked to the radical reform of the United Nations (UN), Governments in the North and the South, Corporations and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Administrative and political reforms at the level of the UN will not be enough to ensure the achievement of the MDGs. It must be accompanied by equally radical reforms among all stakeholders. None has a monopoly on wisdom or is sufficiently equipped to deal effectively with poverty eradication. In a few days, the Heads of States or Governments, representing most of the nation-states on earth will meet to decide on key UN reforms and recommit themselves to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Confederation of Labor (WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) concur with reports from CSOs, Governments and Multilateral Institutions that at the present pace of implementation of commitments made at the 2000 Millennium Summit, we will not achieve the MDGs by 2015. It is therefore necessary to reexamine comprehensively the strategies, policies, programs and roles of the various stakeholders with a view to ensure that mistakes are not repeated, and that new approaches to poverty eradication and development, reenergize the efforts towards achieving the goals. It is in this context that I wish to reflect on the theme of this Roundtable: “United Nations and Civil Society” and reiterate the positions of the WCL/ICFTU that were expressed at the General Assembly Hearings with CSOs in June 2005. MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) conceived by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and implemented by governments of developing and transition economy countries were severely criticized and blamed for weakened states, increasing and deepening poverty, low or negative growth rates and escalating debts. In 1996, the IFIs responded to the widespread criticisms and policy failures by launching the HIPC Initiative (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries). The stated objective was to provide a framework for debt forgiveness and the investment of those resources in the social services with a view to reducing poverty. A major condition to benefit from the initiative was the preparation and implementation of Interim-Poverty Strategy Reduction Papers (PRSPs) and later Full-PRSPs that emphasized growth and poverty reduction. One condition was that governments had to consult civil society. The IFIs emphasized that ownership of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) by the developing countries was crucial. The initiative did not bear the expected fruits. Low or negative growth rates, escalating debts, slow response of donor countries on debt relief and increased poverty led to a modification of the original HIPC. In 1999, the modified initiative promised deeper, broader and faster relief, and also to establish a stronger link between debt relief and poverty reduction. In the United Nations Millennium Summit Declaration of 2000, governments around the world committed themselves to eight development goals, one of which is the halving of poverty by 2015. The IFIs embraced the MDGs and viewed the PRSPs as frameworks that could make the goals realizable. The UN Financing For Development Conference (FFD) of 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico endorsed closer cooperation between the IFIs, UN and WTO. There is an annual meeting between the IFIs, UN-ECOSOC and WTO. Why then, with the closer relations between the UN and the IFIs, the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals are scoring so poorly? Is there consensus and sufficient coordination on Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies? PRSPs REVIEWS In an article published in Development Policy Review (DPR) 2005: “The Macro Content of PRSPs-Assessing the Need for More Flexible Macroeconomic Policy Framework”, 15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were reviewed from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. It concluded that “policy frameworks lack the necessary flexibility to deal with external shocks and address macroeconomics volatility appropriately.” It recommends “a set of policy measures, including avoidance of excessively tight inflation and fiscal targets (with provisions for fluctuations in commodity prices), more room for counter-cyclical policy and adoption of permanent safety nets.”2 Another article in the DPR 2005 entitled “The PRSP approach and the illusion of improved aid effectiveness: Lessons from Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua” adds to emerging policy differences. It states that “donors claim that the PRSP approach will increase aid effectiveness since PRSPs will enhance broad country ownership and lead to better ‘partnership’ with donors, implying more donor coordination under government leadership.” It concludes that by “emphasizing rational planning and ignoring politics, the PRSP approach has unintended and sometimes harmful consequences.”3 THE GUYANA EXPERIENCE The Guyana experience presents numerous problems that must be overcome for that nation-state to achieve the MDGs. The Government of Guyana (GOG) in 1992 inherited an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) from the previous administration. It was the severest structural adjustment program implemented in the global south. Unemployment escalated and poverty in the short term deepened. The new government continued the reforms that resulted in an average growth rate of about 7% during 1992-1997. Poverty it is claimed was reduced by 10%. Poverty in the hinterland and rural areas were not reduced and the gap between the rich and the poor widened. This clearly underlined that the impact of growth on poverty is limited and lacks equity. From 1998 to 2005, the growth rate was reduced drastically. The cumulative growth rate is 0.5%. It is calculated that it takes 2% growth rate to reduce poverty by 1%. As such, poverty in Guyana is not reducing, and if one depends on a high growth rate to reduce poverty, then GOG will not achieve the MDGs. The political party in government has had a consistent record of supporting state intervention in the economy and for investments in the social services. However, it decided to continue with the implementation of the ERP and committed itself to privatization and continuous deregulation of the economy. In 1994, the GOG invited the Carter Center to assist it in designing a National Development Strategy (NDS) with “homegrown policies and programs that would advance economic development and reduce poverty.”4 The NDS did not contain a calculation of the cost and failed to identify sources of finance for implementation. The vision of the plan became a hallucination! Why did the UN and the IFIs not assist the GOG to implement the NDS? Will the reforms of the UN place it in a position to assist countries like Guyana to implement its NDS? Two years later in 1996, the IFIs launched the HIPC Initiative. The GOG entered the HIPC Program and prepared its I-PRSP in June 2000. A Business Summit was held and a plan was agreed on how to attract private investments. In 2001, the GOG prepared a full PRSP and in the process did extensive consultations with civil society as was requested by the IFIs and donors. The GOG claims that the PRSP incorporated the findings of the NDS, the Business Summit and the I-PRSP. There are differences within Guyana as to the veracity of that claim. The GOG obtained debt relief under the original and enhanced HIPC Initiatives and has reduced its debt by 54%.5 Guyana external debt declined from US$2.1B in 1992 to about US$1.2B in 2004.6 The GOG committed itself to the achievement of the MDGs and the implementation of the PRS. The PRS emphasizes broad based growth, stronger institutions, investment in human and physical capital, improved targeting of poverty measures and environmental protection.7 Guyana has a serious race problem between Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese. The predominantly Afro-Guyanese, Trade Union Congress (TUC) and official opposition Peoples National Congress (PNC) did not participate in the consultations. The Private Sector Commission (PSC) did not participate contending that the consultation was about poverty and not business. The point to be underlined is that the GOG committed itself to a neo-liberal economic strategy that is the basis of the PRS in spite of its fundamental differences with the IFIs. The GOG, IFIs, UN and the Donor Agencies in general are supportive of investments in health, education, and access to safe water supply and social infrastructure development. The IDB consistently provides financial resources in significant quantities to support the implementation of the PRSP. It finances projects of the GOG Social Amelioration Program (SIMAP). The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) made available its Basic Needs Trust Fund (BNTF) to also finance social infrastructure projects. There has been an upsurge in the post-1992 period of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) particularly in the area of HIV/AIDS program. Most of the NGOs are service oriented and were born in response to available funding. There are numerous international and inter-hemispheric institutions with representatives assisting in Guyana: IMF, World Bank, IDB, PAHO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO has an HIV/AIDS Project, CIDA, USAID, DFID and European Union (EU). It is evident that the GOG shares economic governance with the IFIs, IDB and Donor Agencies. Why, in spite of this, the GOG will not achieve the MDGs and poverty reduction? The GOG issued a “Report On Progress Towards The Achievement Of The Millennium Development Goals” in July 2003. It stated that Goal 1: reduction of extreme poverty in 2015 is achievable if the growth rate can be restored to 5-6% per annum; Goal 2: it claimed that 97% of children were enrolled at the basic education level; Goal 3: it recorded that some progress has been made; Goal 4: a gradual decline was reported and rates were still high and trends could not be ascertained; Goal 5: will not be achieved and mention was made of weak data collection capacity; Goal 7: it reported achievements inconsistent with reversals; Goal 8: it reported some progress but recent reversals. In the said report the then UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator in his foreword to the report stated: “poor people can hold their politicians accountable for achieving the poverty reduction targets within the specified timetable.”8 The GOG in its evaluation of PRSP consultations with civil society claimed that one negative aspect was that consultations raised high expectations on the part of the poor about deliverables that the government did not have the resources to meet. Recently, the GOG issued a PRSP 2005 Progress Report. The Report was prepared by a Policy Coordination and Program Management Unit (PCPMU). It was presented formally to the public and since then the draft has been circulated widely among Donors and CSOs. A previous report was made in 2002. The Final Report will be presented to the World Bank in October [2005]. The PCPMU secretariat is financed by UK Department for International Department and the World Bank. The report underlined that Guyana uses the Income Approach, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the Living Conditions Survey (LCS) and the Basic Needs Index to measure poverty. Since the HIES will publish its report in 2006, the PRSP 2005 Progress Report used the last census data. This approach has drawn widespread criticism. The report emphasizes the GOG investments in water, electricity, education, housing and land titles. The report’s employment figures have been questioned. The report highlights that the GOG has advanced in all the sectors. It criticized the donors for lagging behind in their pledges. However, at the public forum where the report was presented, the CIDA representative in Guyana objected and requested that the statement be deleted. There is a view among the CSOs that the government formulated the PRSP in order to obtain debt reduction but is not really committed to the implementation of the strategy.9 The GOG sees the glass as half full while the CSOs sees it as half empty. Among the comments made by the UNDP in Guyana on the Progress Report were: 1) considering capacity constraints in the public sector the report is an achievement 2) emphasis was placed on what was achieved ignoring what was not done and what problems exist 3) the 2002 Population Census showed good data on several issues but not sufficiently adequate regarding the impact of the implementation of the PRSP 4) the data on the labor force participation rates of men and women was problematic 5) the manner in which HIV/AIDS issue was reported ignored its impact on the economy and need for a comprehensive national strategy 6) “the emphasis that the PRSP places on Economic Growth to achieve poverty reduction might be overstated. Economic Growth is necessary but not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction. Therefore pro-poor policies need to be introduced into the macro-economic framework.” 7) Governance issues were treated superficially 8) “Since the PRSP was prepared within the constraints set by the anticipated funding flows, it was not possible to identify the totality of actions (and consequent resources) needed to achieve the targets set by the MDGs and by the Sector Plans. This leads to the absence of a coherent analysis of what should be the resource mobilization target. That information is critical to the process of negotiations with Development Partners, in the context of MDG 8. Concrete plans need to be made to identify the country specific MDG targets, which can then be costed, thereby opening up another area of analysis and strengthening the country’s negotiating position.”10 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Officials in a recent statement highlighted that Guyana and Haiti will not achieve the MDGs related to health. The Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) in a number of briefing papers highlighted that donors emphasize technical solutions rather than good governance; are not accountable to anyone internally; the government is more accountable to donors than taxpayers since they are the increasing source of funding and “that market forces, the engine of the system, allow no space for considerations of equity, justice or other values that imply regulation, moderation or control.”11 The GOG has emphasized in the PRSP the need to create decent jobs. However, employment targets have not been set in the PRSP. The WCL/ICFTU has been lobbying multilateral institutions to recognize the importance of job creation. This is why, in June here at the UN, once more, trade unions called for a resolution to be approved at the upcoming summit to establish decent jobs as GOAL 9. The experience in Guyana strengthens our case. For example, access to safe water is a priority for the GOG and Donors. Recently, the CEO of Guyana Water Incorporated (GWI) on television announced that many households will have their water supply disconnected if they do not pay up their water bills. How do unemployed households pay water bills? Millions of dollars are spent to provide safe access to water and later the access is terminated because the poor are unemployed and cannot pay the water bills. How do we achieve the MDGs with these shortsighted policies? The GOG and the people of Guyana face a number of other hurdles towards the achievement of the MDGs. Guyana depends on exports in sugar, rice, bauxite and lumber. Its gold industry is in decline. Sugar accounts for over 50% of its agricultural production. At 17%, it is the single highest contributor to GDP and largest foreign export earner (US$133 M per year). The industry facilitates 5,000 private cane farmers and 10,000 persons provide goods and services for the industry. It employs 17,500 permanent and 4,000 temporary workers. It supports 24% of Guyana’s population. The EU intends to cut the price it pays for Guyana sugar by 39% that amounts to US$40M and the Caribbean US$100M annually.12 The G8 has included Guyana in its debt forgiveness declaration at its recent meeting. The other major problem Guyana and all poor countries face today is the exorbitant oil prices. It will not be possible to reduce poverty with the present oil prices. Will the oil corporations declare their exorbitant profits and support a fund for poverty reduction? How will Guyana achieve the MDGs and benefit from debt forgiveness under these circumstances? What is given with one hand is taken away by the other? These policies are evidently contradictory. The PRSP emphasizes the creation of an enabling national environment for investments. Guyana during the 19th and 20th centuries has only attracted significant investments in the primary sector of the economy. Today, the country faces similar problems in attracting investors. The GOG problems are compounded by major social, security and governance issues. The British and American administrations in pursuit of cold war objectives in the 1960s imposed an electoral system (Proportional Representation) that institutionalized racial voting. The country has two major racial groups: Indo Guyanese (majority) and Afro Guyanese (minority). Since 1992, when the country begun to have free and fair elections, the (PPP) political party of predominantly Indo Guyanese won all the elections. After each election since then, the predominantly Afro Guyanese opposition party (PNC) led protest demonstrations that degenerated into racial violence in which Guyanese women in particular were selectively targeted. Constitutional reforms are yet to address this electoral issue effectively. This political instability is a disincentive to both local and foreign investors. This problem is now compounded with a major security problem. Guyana has become a major trans-shipment point for narcotics. “Drug lords” have emerged in the society and wield important influence in the country. CSOs fear that the nation-state can become a “narco-state.”13 Additionally, both Canada and the USA have deported many “hardened criminals” of Guyanese origin back to Guyana. It is ironic that Guyanese teachers and nurses emigrate to the USA and Canada while world class criminals are returned to provide leadership and technological know-how to local “gang and drug lords.” The drug problem and the deepening of poverty have contributed to the escalation of crime by “gang lords.” Robberies have escalated and businessmen and women are increasingly targeted. The general climate of insecurity intensifies the emigration of Guyanese to OECD countries. Eighty three (83%) of Guyanese university graduates live in OECD countries.14 There is an urgent need to deepen the professionalism and capacity of the military and police forces to respond to the crime wave and secure the porous borders from narcotics entering the country. Can the UN and other international institutions assist the GOG before the country degenerates to a reality similar to Haiti? Will it not cost less now than intervening later? There is no doubt that the UN is presently implementing social cohesion and development projects within the framework of PRS and the MDGs, but the social, security and governance issues are undermining the international cooperation efforts to bear fruits. Will the reforms proposed by the Secretary General respond to these problems at the national levels? Can the UN, even with reforms, respond alone and be effective, in a case like Guyana? It is in this background of concrete problems in Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia and Guyana that I wish to make a few brief remarks in answer to the questions posed at this roundtable. How can thousands of NGOs effectively shape a credible, coherent voice at the UN? How can civil society organizations reorganize themselves to be more effective partners of the United Nations? Labor has been speaking with one voice for sometime now at the UN, IFIs and WTO. Here at the UN, both WCL and ICFTU representatives work within an informal Labor Caucus to mainstream labor’s policy issues. Both the WCL and ICFTU have permanent representatives at the UN and have invested financial and human resources supporting the work of the UN. In Washington DC, both the ICFTU and WCL jointly meet biannually with the Heads, Management and Senior Staff of the IFIs to dialogue on policy issues affecting labor. At the WTO, we also coordinate and have joint policy positions. At the World Social Forum, both the WCL and ICFTU worked with NGOs to form the Global Call To Action Against Poverty (GCAP). At the World Economic Forum and the ILO we also coordinate our policy positions. Last, but not least, the WCL and ICFTU are engaged in intense negotiations to launch, next year, one united international trade union central. All trade unions around the world will be invited to join. It will be democratic and pluralist. Labor therefore is “ahead of the game” in deepening a coherent voice for workers and their organizations in almost every country on earth. NGOs face a very complex challenge in this regard, but both ICFTU and WCL have consistently extended a hand to all civil society organizations, to work together on issues that are of vital interests to workers and humanity as a whole. Is it enough that the intergovernmental mechanisms of the United Nations be modernized, if member states fail to engage in multilateral efforts to solve shared problems? The WCL/ICFTU is committed to multilateralism. We believe that unilateralism will destabilize the world and is incapable of effectively dealing with development, peace or human rights. At the beginning of this presentation, I underlined emphatically that not only the UN has to reform and modernize, but also all governments, North and South, IFIs, WTO, private sector and CSOs. The problems of development, poverty eradication and peace are too complex and costly to be dealt with by one nation-state or one global or inter-hemispheric institution. The realities of Guyana, Honduras, Bolivia and Nicaragua, as discussed above, confirm this. What role can civil society demand in an intergovernmental body such as the United Nations? The trade union movement accompanied the UN from its inception. Labor has enjoyed consultative status at the UN since the founding of ECOSC. We had hoped to obtain a seat on ECOSOC, and we still believe that labor can make a more important and effective contribution should we obtain that seat. Labor enjoys a unique position at the ILO. The problems that face workers and trade unions are related to the work of all UN Agencies. As such, we would like to enjoy strengthened consultative and advisory roles across the board. Additionally, in key UN decision making organs like the General Assembly and the Security Council labor does not enjoy consultative status. This ought to be corrected. Labor supports the establishment of new Councils as proposed by the Secretary General but we also ask that CSOs be granted consultative status. The UN and all international institutions have to give meaning to the consultative policy making processes by including the inputs of CSOs when they are consulted. This is a major deficiency in the relations between CSOs, the UN and other international institutions. 1 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) & World Confederation of Labor (WCL) represents trade union centrals in over 160 countries. 2 PRS Watch/PRS Watch@host.netalantic.com/August/17th 2005. 3 IBID,PRS WATCH. 4 I-PRSP/June 2000/GOG Document. 5 Guyana: IMF & World Bank Support US$334 Million Additional Debt Relief/News Release No: 2004/195/LACHTTP://website.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/GUYANAEXT/7/20/05). 6 PRSP Progress Report 2005/Chapter2/Georgetown/Guyana. 7 PRSP 2001/GOG Document. 8 Report On Progress Towards The Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals/Guyana July 2003. 9 Interviews conducted in Guyana with several NGO/August 2005. 10 UNDP Comments On The 2005 PRSP Progress Report. 11 Civil Society Forum On Solidarity And Inclusiveness/Background Briefing Papers 1-4 December 2002/GHRA &Others/Georgetown, Guyana). 12 Narine, Seepaul: GAWU General Secretary’s General Council Report/2005. 13 Interviews with several NGOs in Guyana August 2005. 14 Economist, April2, 2005. Paul N. Tennassee is WCL Representative United Nations/Director WCL Washington Liaison Office. He is also Producer/Host: CaribNation Television Program. Editor’s Note: This article was emailed to the Office of the President, Georgetown, Guyana for comments. The Liaison Officer acknowledged receipt and said he forwarded it to the Head of the Secretariat. No response was received at press time.

Current Main Writings E-mail
© Copyright GuyanaJournal